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SITUATION I 
NEUTRALITY AND AIRCRAFT 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
(a) A dirigible, belonging to the air forces of the 
State X, arrives at a commercial airport of State Z, and 
the commander requests that the hydrogen, with which 
it is filled, be replaced by helium, purchased before the 
'var, but in storage undelivered at the airport. 
'Vhat reply should the government of State Z give~ 
(b) A naval aircraft of State X of the largest sea-
plane type is forced down from mechanical causes in 
the open sea off the coast of State Z. Help is requested 
and the plane is to,ved by a local vessel to safe nloor-
ings within harbor of Z. In the quiet ·waters of the 
harbor, the cre'v effect necessary repairs in 24 hours, 
and the commanding officer requests permission to 
proceed. 
'Vhat reply should the government of State Z give~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) The govern1nent of State Z should deny the re-
quest of the commander of the dirigible of the air forces 
of State X to replace the hydrogen by helium. 
(b) The government o£ State Z should intern the 
seaplane and its personnel. 
Definitions.-Aircraft as used in air navigation in the 
Panama Canal Zone is defined as "any contrivance now 
known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for na vi-
gation of or flight in the air, except a parachute or other 
contrivance designed for such navigation but used pri-
marily as safety equipment." (Regulations to Govern 
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Air Navigation in the Canal Zone, Septr1nber 22, 1931,. 
sec. 11 and Appendix 2.) 
Air space is " construed to mean the air vertically oYer-
lying any area that Inay be designated," and " The Pan-
ama Canal Zone including the ' three-mile limit'" 'vas 
designated in 1926 " to be a ~lilitary Airspace Reserva-
tion." (44 U. S. Stat. 568.) 
B,arly ?'egulation of aerial navigation.-\\Thile there 
have been advocates of the doctrine of freedon1 of the 
air, in practice, states ha Ye tended to regulate the usc 
of superjacent space by aircraft. Early regulations 
'vere 1nainly of the nature of national police control to 
prevent da1nage to property and persons by balloons. 
For n1any years, aerial navigation 'vas for the most part 
a spectacular experi1nent involving risks against 'vhich 
each state endeavored to provide. National regulation 
therefore preceded international. 
Discussion of international regulations was carried on 
before long-range flights 'vere C0Illn10ll. rrhe . Institute 
of International La,v at its session in Ghent in 1906 
adopted in its proposed international regulation of 
wireless telegraphy as "Article 1. The air is free. 
States have over it, in tin1e of peace and in time of 'var, 
only the rights necessary for their preservation." Sub-
sequent study by the institute 1naterially changed the 
point of vie'v and at the 1neeting at ~fadrid in 1911 an 
article on the legal status of aircraft 'vas adopted as 
:follows: 
3. International aerial eirculation is free, saYing the right 
of subjacent States to take certain measures, to be detennined, 
to ensure their owi1 security nnd that of the persons and prop-
erty of their inhabitants. (Resolutions of the Institute of 
International Law, Carnegie IDndown1ent for International Peace, 
p. 171.) 
Institute of International Law, 1927.-,.The institute 
at the session of 1927 at Lausanne adopted, after dis-
cussion o:f the conflicting theories of the sovereignty and 
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o£ the £reedon1 o£ the air, the £ollo,ving as a proposed 
regulation of aerial navigation: 
Art. 1. Il [l ppartien t a ch[lque ~~tate de regler l'usage de l'air 
au-dessus de son territorie, en tenant compte d'une })art des 
neeessites de la circulation aerienne internationale ( atterrissage 
compris), d'autre part, des necessites de la securite nationale, 
t[lnt au point de yue 1nilitaire, douanier, sanitaire, qu'au point de 
Yue de la protection des personnes et des biens de ses habitants. 
Art. 3. N'ont pas droit au regime de libre circulation inter-
Ita tiouale, les aeronefs affectes au serYice de la puiss[lnce pub-
lique d'un Etn t et les aeronefs faisant partie du materiel de 
guerre <l'un Etat ou commnnde p[lr un militaire commissionne 
a cet effect. (3~ Annuaire, Institut de Droit International, vol. 
3, l1P. 337' 338.) 
Later regula.tions.-'I'he freedon1 of aerial naviga-
tion 'Yas not generally accepted, ho,Yever, and states 
n1ade regulations restricting the use both of national 
and foreign aircraft. Soinetiines, even, the regula-
tions of adjoining subcliYisions of a state ·were not in 
confonnity. The conYention relating to the regulation 
of air navigation, signed at Paris, October 13, 1919, 
states: 
Art. 1. The high contracting parties recognize that every power 
bas complete aud exclusive sovereignty over the air space above 
its territory. 
For the tnnpose of the vresent convention the territory of 
a state shall be understood as including the nationnl territory, 
both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the 
territorial waters adjacent thereto. (1929, Kaval \Var Col-
lege, International La\v Situatious, p. 26.) 
'fhe sa1ne· principle ",.as affirmed at Havana in 1928 
in the conYention on commercial avjation. 
National and international rules for regjstration, in-
denlnification, flight, landing, etc., have rapidly de-
Yeloped. GoYernn1ent control has been easy because 
states seeking to do1ninate or lead in aviation have 'vill-
ingly granted subsidies to con1panies engaged both ]n 
1nanufactnre and operation of aircraft. France seen1s 
to have increased subsidies so that the an1ount for 1929 
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'vas n1ore than one hundred times the amount o:f 1919. 
Other states have :follo·wed varying syste1ns of aiding 
private or quasi-private companies and there are differ-
ing opinions as to the merits of the respective systems. 
0 onditions of registration.-The conditions of regis-
tration vary and may in some instances determine the 
treatn1ent to which an aircraft is liable in a :foreign state 
whether that state be belligerent or neutral. In the case 
of the Panama Canal Zone certain prerequisites condi-
tion licensing and registration. 
1. An aircraft, to be entitled to license and registry, must be 
airworthy and equipped in accordance 'vith the requirements of 
the Canal Zone and owned by 
(a) A citizen of the United States. 
(b) The Government of the United States, a State, Territory, 
or possession, or a political subdivision thereof. 
Undoubtedly war would be a " time o:f emergency " 
and it would be difficult :for a neutral to deter1nine long 
in advance ho'v a modern machine like a private air-
craft even thus registered should be treated. An aircraft 
of an enemy at the outbreak o:f war in a belligerent 
state 1night be seized and such an aircraft subsequently 
entering belligerent jurisdiction would be likewise 
seized. 
Communication by air.-Whatever the differences of 
opinion in regard to the systems and regulation of aerial 
communication, there is no difference of opinion as to 
the present necessity of such co1n1nunication both in 
time of peace and in time of war. While .in the early 
stages of the development of aerial communication states 
viewed with comparative indifference the use of the su-
perjacent air, now this use is in many states jealously 
guarded as would be a railway right o:f way across its 
territory, and :foreign airlines are in general under re-
strictions prescribed in article 15 of the convention o:f 
1919 which provides that " The establishment of inter-
national air,vays should be subject to the consent of the 
states flo,vn over." In some respects the slogan ":free-
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do1n of the seas" is being super~eded by the slogan 
~~ fredom of the air," but is n1eeting with little approvaL 
Indirect limitation on aircraft.-While there may in 
some states be no direct limitation upon the use or num-
ber of foreign aircraft within their territorial jurisdic-
tion, indirect limitation 1nay arise through rules requir-
ing landing at certain places, etc., in the time of peacer 
Naval powers have also been limited indirectly by con-
Yentions such as the Washington Convention of 1922 pre-
scribing the character and the use of naval vessels as air-· 
craft carriers. 
Procla1nation regarding Pana1na, 191,4.-0ne of the· 
earliest statements made by the United States in regard 
to aircraft was in the proclamation of November 13,. 
1914, concerning the neutrality of the Panama Canal 
Zone. 'Vhile the prea1nble states that the United States-
exercises sovereignty in the land and 'vaters of the zone,. 
the articles assume the right to exercise authority in. 
the superjacent air. 
\Vhereas the United States is neutral in the present war and' 
whereas the United States exercises sovereignty in the land and. 
\Vaters of the Canal Zone and is authorized by its treaty with 
Panama of February 26, 1904, to maintain neutrality in the cities 
of Panama and Colon, and the harbors adjacent to the said 
cities: * * * 
Rule 15.-Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, are· 
forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United 
States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above 
the lands and waters within said jurisdiction. 
Rule 16.-For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes-
the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the 
~aiel cities. (1915, Naval "Tar College, International Law Topicsr 
p. 11.) 
Limitation, treaty of Versailles, 191t9.-Part V of the 
treaty of Versailles, 1919, has as its introductory clause: 
In order to render possible the initiation of a general limita-
tion of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly 
to. observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow. 
(1919, Naval \Vur College, International Law Documents, p. 70.) 
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In carrying out this purpose, article 1D8 prescribed 
that "rfhe ar1ned forces of Gern1any 1nust not include 
any n1ilitary or naYal air forces.'' 
Other articles to re1nain in force till Jan nary 1 ~ 1923, 
unless Ger1nany hacl preYiously becon1e a Ineinber of 
the fa1nily of nations, gave the ... \llied ancl Associated 
Po,Yers privileges si1nilar to those of German aircraft. 
Article 313. '.rile aircraft of tlle Allied and Associated Po,yers 
shall haYe full liberty of pa~~age mHl landing oYer and in the 
territory and territorial waters of Gernwu~·. an(1 shall enjo;"· the 
same priYileges as German aircraft. 1mrticularly in ea~e of 
distress by land ancl sea. 
Article 314. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers 
shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy 
the right of flying oYer the territory and territorial waters of 
Germany without landing, subject ahYays to any regulations 
which may be made by Germany, and which shall be applicable 
equally to the aircraft of Gern1any and to those of the Allied 
and Associated countries. 
Article 315. All aerodromes in Germany open to national public 
traftk shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated 
Powers, and in any such aerodron1e such aircraft shall be treated 
on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regards charges 
of eYery description, including charges for landing and accommo-
dation. (Ibid, p. 156.) 
These li1nitations 'Yere not : .... uch as the Allied Po·wers 
"·oulcl propose as the basis for general regulations to 
prevail an1ong the1nselves. Incleecl .. the Allied Po,vers 
'Yould probably not "·ish such regulations to prevail 
even for the1nselves after nor1nal relations 'vere rees-
tablished as geographical ancl other conditions n1ight 
giYe unequal advantages to so1ne of their nun1ber. 
La-ws of the United ~'tates.-By an act of ~fay 20, 1926, 
the use of aircraft 'Yas prescribed and it w,.as stated 
that-
'J:1he Cougress herebr declares that the GoYenunent of the 
United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, com-
plete soyereignty of the air~vace oyer the l:uu1R a n<l \Yn ter:-: 
of the United States, including the Canal Zone. Aircraft a part 
of tbc anned forces of any foreign nation shall not be navigated 
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in the ruited States, including the Canal Zone. except in accord-
anee ''"ith un autlwrizntion granted by. the Secretary of State. 
( -!-! r. S. Stat. 572.) 
Definitions of tern1s used in the act ,yere given and 
son1e of these have been einbocliecl in treaties, regula-
tions, etc. 
P1'olzibited carriage.-By Executive order of Febru-
ary 18, 1D2D, issued in accordance 'Yith the act of August 
2±~ 1D12 (37 U. S. Stat. 560) : 
a. The carriage hy vriYate nircraft of arms and Inunitions of 
war, anll of snch nrticles a~ are or may be prohibited by law and 
regulations of tlle Unitell State~ in force· in the Panama Canal 
~one or of the State in whic-h the aircraft is registered is pro-
hibited. 
b. E::qn'ess license and authority must be procured from author-
ized Panama Canal Zone offic-ial:-.: for the carriage in private ·air-
craft of arms for hunting or protection of crew and cargo, 
commercial explosiYes, vhotogrnvhic apparatus not boxed and 
scaled, and such other articles as the GoYernor of the Panama 
Canal may prescribe. 
Ilcgulations in genera.1.-It is no\Y generally achnittecl 
that regulations for the use of aircraft 1nay have some 
analogies to the regulations for the use of naval craft: 
yet aerial navigation is £o unlike 1nariti1ne navigation 
that analogies are often \.,.ery 1nisleacling. The tin1e ele-
Inent in the use of aircraft as "·ell as the space ele1nent 
is, in 1nany respects~ unlike that in the use of naval craft. 
The increased range of vision introduces other problen1s 
\Yhich have led to propo~ition~ to extend the aerial zone 
beyond the co1nn1only accepted 3-Inile 1naritime zone of 
j uriscliction. 
rfhere \YOUld still re1nain Certain problenlS as to using 
higher aerial zones along the frontier of aclj a cent states. 
In any case it is recognized that there are differences in 
the nature of the use of the air over land and over terri-
torial "~aters. 
Oo1n1nission of Ju1·ists, 1923.-The use of higher aerial 
zones at sea 'vas one of the n1atters under consideration 
by the Commission of ~Jurists to consider and report 
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upon the l{evision of the Rules of ''Tarfare at 'fhe 
Hague in 1923. The Italian delegate particularly ad-
vocated a 10-Inile national jurisdiction for aerial pur-
poses while not proposing a change in 1naritime jurisdic-
tion. The commission did not regard the proposal as 
practicable, calling attention to the case in 'vhich a 
neutral state, which maintained the 3-mile limit of 
1naritime jurisdiction, might desire to take action against 
a belligerent hydroplane flying "\vithin 10 miles of the 
.coast but over the high geas. The hydroplane might 
alight and at once be outside neutral jurisdiction and on 
the high seas. The report of the commission said: 
On principle it would seem that the jurisdiction in the air-
·Space should be appurtenant to the territorial jurisdiction enjo~·ed 
.beneath it, and that in the absence of a territorial jurisdiction 
,beneath, there is no sound basis for jurisdiction in the air. 
Furthermore, it is felt that the obligation to enforce respect 
for neutral rights throughout a 10-mile belt would impose an 
increased burden on neutral Powers without adequate compen-
.sating advantages. Even with this wider belt it would still be 
easy for airmen fighting in the air to lose their bearings in the 
heat of the combat, and to encroach inadvertently on neutral 
_jurisdiction. Lastly, the greater the distance from the coast, the 
more difficult it is for the position of an aircraft to be determined 
with precision, and the more frequent, therefore, will disputes 
become between belligerent and neutral States as to violation by 
the former's aircraft of the latter's jurisdiction. (1924, Na ,·al 
War College, International Law Documents, p. 152.) 
The Italian delegation while renouncing further im-
_mediate consideration of the proposition states that-
1. It does not think it desirable to resun1e in Plenary Com-
mission the discussion of a question which has on several occa-
sions been considered in all the necessary detail during the meet-
ings of the Sub-Comn1ittee. 
2. Nevertheless, although the 1najority of the Delegations ha,·e 
already put forward views opposed to it~ proposal, it continues 
to believe in the importance of that proposal and in the necessity 
for its adoption and insertion in an international convention. 
3. Frmn the pDint of Yiew both of belligerent and of neutral 
.States, their are reasons of the highest juridicial and tef'hnieal 
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iinportance which make it indispensable to allow each State th~ 
vower of including in its jurisdiction the atmospheric space to a 
distance of 10 miles from its coast. 
4. The difficulties resulting from the difference between the 
width of the marginal air-belt and the width of national terri-
torial waters would not seem to be so ser· ous as to render the 
Italian proposal unacceptable in practice. 
5. In any case, there is no juridical obstacle to the fixing of 
the same width of space for the marginal air-belt as for terri-
torial waters, the Italian Delegation being of opinion that inter-
national law, as generally recognised, contains no rule prohibit-
ing a State from extending its territorial waters to a distance 
<>f 10 sea-miles from its coasts. 
6. In conclusion, it urges that a question of such paramount 
importance should be reopened and placed upon the agenda of a 
<!onference in the near future. (Ibid, p. 153.) 
League of Nations Oommission.-The League of 
Nations Preparatory Commission :for the Disarmament 
Conference considered the question o:f limitation o:f air 
ar1na1nent :fro1n time to time. There seemed to be a 
general opinion that civil aircraft would play a very 
itnportant part in any 'var that 1night arise. It was 
proposed that aircraft be distinguished by type, antici-
pating that one type 'vould be characteristically military 
11nd another civil. It 'vas admitted that such distinctive 
types had not yet evolved. It was also admitted that in 
any attempt at lilnitation o:f air forces, it 'vould be dif-
ficult to detern1ine the potential air personnel and even 
1nore difficult to determine air material in reserve. Much 
difficulty was experienced in defining clearly the term 
" in reserve." Some regarded material in reserve as 
merely substitute 1naterial provided for emergency need 
o:f aircraft in co1nmission; son1e would extend the idea 
to cover material that could be mobilized in case o£ need 
and others admitted that no satisfactory determination 
-could be made. There were also n1any problems in Inark-
ing off civil aviation undertakings from military and 
strategic. 
Draft 0 onvention, 1930.-The Draft Convention pre-
pared by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarn1-
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antent Conference in referring to air arnuunent in arti-
cle 28 e1nbodied the provision, "No preparations shall 
be 1nade in civil aircraft in ti1ne of peace for the instal-
lation of \Varlike ar1na1nents for the purpose of con-
Yerting such aircraft into 1nilitary aircraft." (League 
of Nations, C. 4, ~1. 4, 1931, IX (C. P. D. ( 1)), p. G07.) 
Other provisions \Vere also e1nbodied to distinguish 1nili-
tary and private aircraft. In the preli1ninary discus-
sions of the coininission, how·ever, In any differences o:f 
opinion 'vere manifest. 
Application of rules.-Rules for land and 1nariti1ne 
'varfare haYe beco1ne fairly \Yell established. It has 
been argued that these so far as their principles are 
applicable be extended to the air. So1ne of these rules 
may doubtless be applicable. The follo,ving 1night be 
in this category even i:f it afforded no final criteria for 
op1n1on: 
XIII, HAGFE COL\"YEXTIO~, RIGHTS AKD Dl-TlES OF XEUTlL\L 
l'U\\'ERS IN l\1AHITDIE ,Y_-\R 
Art. 1. Belligerents are bound to respect the soYereign rigllts 
of neutl'n I Power~, and to abstain, in neutral ten·itory or neutral 
waters, frmn all acts which "-ouhl eonstitntE', on the pnrt of 
the neutral Powers, which knowingly 11ermitted them. a non-
fulfilment of their neutrality. 
There has been 1nuch discussion as to 'vhether an air-
craft is a n1eans of transportation and analogous to a 
1nariti1ne Yessel or an instru1nent of 'var and analogous 
to a projectile, i. e. a 'vinged intelligent projectile. In 
any case it is an instru1nent in 'vhich the ti1ne and space 
ele1nents in the region aboYe the earth "s surface have 
been reduced to the 1ninin1u1n . 
..t17nerican-Ger7nan correspondence, 1915.-0n Janu-
ary 19, 1915, the Ger1nan a1nbassador raised question 
\Vith the Secretary of State as to the delivery o:f hydro-
aeroplanes by a neutral fir1n to a belligerent state. The 
Ger1nan position "~as stated as :follo,vs: 
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There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regarded as 
war vessels \vhose delivery to belligerents states by neutrals 
~hould be stot)l)ed under Article 8 of the thirteenth convention 
of the Second Hague Conference of October 18, 1907. Hydro-
aeroplanes are not Inentioned by name in the convention simply 
Leca use there was none in 1907 at the time of the conference. 
( 1915, Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 777.) 
To the letter o£ the Gern1an a1nbassador, Secretary of 
State Bryan replied on January 29: 
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your excellency's note of the 19th instant~ and in reply have to 
inform you that the statements contained in your excellency's 
note hnve receiYed my careful consideration in vie\v of the 
earnest purpose of this GoYernment to perform every duty which 
is imposed upon it as a neutral by treaty stipulation and inter-
national law. 
The e:-:sential statement in your note, which implies an obliga-
tion on the part of this Government to interfere in the sale 
and delivery of hydro-aeroplanes to belligerent powers, is: 
.. There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regarded 
as war Yessels whose deliYery to belligerent states by neutrals 
should be stopped under Article 8 of the thirteenth convention of 
the Second Hague Conference of O<.:tober 18, 1907." 
As to thb ;tssertion of the character of hydro-aeroplanes I sub-
mit the following conunents: The fact that a hydro-aeroplane is 
fitted with apparatus to rise fron1 and alight upon the sea does 
not in my opinion give it the character of a vessel any n1ore than 
the wheels attached to an aeroplane fitting it to rise from and 
alight upon land give the latter the character of a land vehicle. 
Both the hydro-aeroplane and the aeroplane are essentially air-
craft; as an aid in military operations they can only be used in 
the air. The fact that one starts its flight from the surface of 
the sea and the other frOin the land is a mere inciclen t which in 
no \Yay affects their aerial character. 
In view of these fncts I n1ust dissent from your excellency's as-
sertion that "there is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes 1nust be 
regarded as war Yessels," and consequently I do not regard the 
obligations imposed by treaty or by the accepted rules of inter-
national law applicable to aircraft of any sort. 
In this connection I further call to your excellency's attention 
that acconling to the latest advices received by this Department 
the German Imperial Government include " balloons and flying 
machines and their component parts" in the list of conditional 
138120-32--2 
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tontraband, an<l that in the Imperial prize ordinance, drafted 
Septe1nber 30, 1909~, and issued in the Reichs-Gesetzblatt on Au· 
.gust 3, 1914, appear as conditional contraband " airships and fly-
ing machines" (Article 23, section 8). It thus appears that the 
I1nperial Government have placed and still retain aircraft of all 
descriptions in the class of conditional contraband, for which no 
special treatment involving neutral duty is, so far as I am ad-
vised, provided by any treaty to which the United States is a 
.signa tory or adhering power. 
As in the views of this Departinent the provisions of Conven-
tion XIII of the Second Hague Convention do not apply to hydro-
aeroplanes I do not consider it necessary to discuss the question 
.as to whether those provisions are in force during the present 
war. (Ibid, p. 780.) 
Neutrality proclamation, 1914.-Under accepted prin-
·ciples of international law a neutral state 1nay not di-
rectly or indirectly supply a belligerent with materials 
.of 'var or allow its ports to be used as bases by bellig-
·erents. 
Question has been raised as to whether supplies or 
'var material purchased before the war and still within 
neutral jurisdiction may be withdrawn by the bellig-
<erent during the war. 
The proclamation of neutrality of the United States 
in 1914 stated that-
'Vhereas the laws and treaties of the United States, without 
"interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, 
or with the cmnmercial manufacture or sale of arms or muni-
.tions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be 
-within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial 
:neutrality during the existence of the contest; 
And whereas it is the duty of a neutral government not to 
~permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the 
,purposes of war; * * * 
r.rhe following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe pen-
alties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, 
to wit: 
8. Fitting out and arming. or attemvting to fit out and arm, 
ot· procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being con-
-cerned in the furnishing, fitting out. or arming of any ship or 
vessel with intent that such ship or Yessel shall be employed in 
:the service of either of the said belligerents. * * * 
SUPPLIES FOR AIRCRAFT 13 
10. Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or 
nugmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or aug-
menting, the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed 
Yessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States 
was a ship of war, cruiser, or armed Yessel in the service of 
either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects of 
either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessels, or by 
changing those on board of her for guns of a larger caliber. 
'I'his proclamation also provided that-
no ship of war or privateer of any belligerent shall be permitted 
to make use of any port, harbor, roadstead, or other waters within 
the jurisdiction of the United States as a station or place of resort 
for any warlike purpose or for the purpose of obtaining any facil-
ities of warlike equipment; (1915, Naval 'Var College. Interna-
tional Law Topics, p. 7.) 
'l'hese principles "\vould extend equally to aircraft or 
other ne'v means of "\varfare. 
f Supplies.-It is evident that law relating to certain 
) aspects of the rights and duties of states in the super-
. j a cent air in the ti1ne of war is not yet ·clearly estab-
lished. In 1nany phases there are possible analogies to 
the principles of the la·w of n1ariti1ne and land warfare. 
The fact that tilne and space are greatly reduced as 
factors in move1nent of aerial 'varcraft as coin pared 
with naval warcraft beco1nes a 1natter of great signifi-
-canc~. Some states have accordingly prohibited to nlili-
tary aircraft any entrance to their jurisdiction. It is 
no'v a generally accepted principle that the belligerent 
should not use and that the neutral should not permit 
the use of its territory as a base. The fuel of an air-
-craft is at present a 1nost i1nportant element in its use. 
·To afford safe port for the exchange of a less service-
.able fuel for a n1ore serviceable fuel ·would not be merely 
to render the aircraft airworthy, but would be perinit-
ting the use of the airport as a base and should accord-
ingly be forbidden by the neutral. In n1aritime 'var 
:article 8 of the 1907 Hague Convention concerning the 
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rights and duties of neutral po·wers in naval 'var applies 
and is as follo·ws : 
A neutral GoYernment is bound to employ the means at its 
(li::-;posal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel witllin 
its jurisdiction which it ha:-:; reason to belieYe is intended to 
cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with 
which that Government is at pe~ce. It is also bound to display 
the same vigilance to 1n·event the <1epartnre from its jul'istliction 
of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, 
which had been adapted entirel~· or partly within the said juris-
diet' on for use in war. (1908~ ~a val War College, International 
Law Situations, p. 215.) 
rrhe principles of this COllYention "·auld apply to air-
craft 'Yithin neutral jnrisclictio9-:-i} 
British-Dutch cOJ'Pespondence, 1916.-ln April, 1916, 
a British seaplane 'Yhich fell W'ell out in the North Sea 
"·as, 'vith its piloL picked up by a Dutch lugger and 
taken to a Dutch port. 1'his event gave rise to consid-
erable correspondence bet,yeen the Governn1ents of the 
.parti-es concerned. Son1e of the correspondence stated 
the official contentions . 
.... <\.. men1oranchun of the British Foreign Office of 
~fay 31, 1916, stated the G·overn1nent's position quite 
fully, and is therefore given some,vhat at length: 
A seaplane belonging to His :\faje::-;ty's forces was recently 
olJliged on account of engine trouble to descend while over the 
X orth Sea. The 11ilot was rescued by a Dutch fishing boat, 
which took both hin1 and the seaplane into a Dutch port. The 
XE'tllerlands Goveniment, though they have released the pilot, 
apr1ear to consider it their duty to retain the seaplane for the 
duration of the war. After a careful consideration of the 
question, His :Majesty's Govenunent feel bound to dissent from 
this view, and believe that the Netherlands Government are under 
no obligation to intern the machine. 
The Netherlands GoYernment, in releasing the pilot, appear to 
haYe considered that he was in the same position as a n1ember 
of a crew of a shitn\Teckell b~'ligerent warship who is })ieked 
up by a neutral merchant Yessel and conveyed to a neutral port; 
such a person, under the rules of The Hague Convention No. 10, 
of 1907, is entitled to be released. His :L\Injesty's GoYenunent 
believe their decision on tl1is point to be correct and consider 
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that, while none of the rules expre~sly laid down by international 
law exaetly fit the case of the seaplane, a further exan1ination 
of the principles which lie behind the rules \Yhich compel neutrals 
to intern belligerent forces in certain circumstances shows that 
the senplane should nlso he released. 
The rules concerning internment are not based on any single 
awl uniform principle. This fact exvlains itself when one 
take~ iuto consideration that the~e rules ha Ye grown up gracl-
ua lly and seYerully and were, before the Peace Conference at 
~rhe Ilngue in 1907, customarily :tgrced upon from different 
moti n :•s. 'l'he consequenee is tlw t the rules governing intern-
ment lliffpr not only with regard to the internment of soldiers 
on neutral law1 and internment of warships in neutral har-
bour~, hut also with regard to the internment of troops in gen-
eral, an(1 the internment of such sollliers as hnYe escaped from 
en pti ,.i ty. 
One of tile basic reasons for the l'Ules concerning internment 
i~ no llonbt the fact that a belligerent is entitled to insist that 
such enemy forces as haYe crossed neutral territory for the pur-
pose of escaping capture, shall not be ena hied to leave the neutral 
territory, nnd again resort to hostilitie~. But this concerns only 
enemy forces which ha ,.e deli hera tel,,· entered neutral territory 
for tlte 11urpose of escaping capture: it cannot apply to such 
enemy forces as for othe1· purpose~ cro~s into neutral terri-
tory, or e\·en cross accidentally without knowledge of the neutral 
frontier. Now, all these n1ust likewi~e be interned, and the 
hask reason for their internment i~ thn t, in ense these troops 
are not interned, the other belligerent would be justified in 
crossing into the neutral territory on hi~ part nn<l attacking 
tlle enemy there. 
As regnrds the internment of men-of-\Ynr, the basic reasons 
are also manifold. One is-just a:;.: in tlte cnse of fugitiYe 
troops-that a belligerent is entitled to insist that enemy Inen-
of-war which deliberately enter neutral harbours for the pur-
IWSe of escaping capture, shall not after some length of thne 
be allowed to lea Ye and resort to hostilities again, although they 
may leaYe if they only stay twent~·-four hours. Other re~lsons 
are that a neutral must not allow belligerent n1en-of-war to mal~e 
his harbours the bnse of n1ilita ry operations, the bnse of supply 
ueyonc1 a certain lin1it, the base for repairing vital damages, 
and the like. 
Considering that a neutral IH'e<l not intern soldiers who escape 
from captivity, that he need not intern such sltipwrecked men as 
ha ,.e been rescued by neutral merchantmen and brought to neutral 
ports; that he need not intern such men-of-war as call at neutral 
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harbours for legitimate purpo~es; and the like-there is without 
doubt no general rule in existence which compels a neutral to in-
tern in every case every member of belligerent forces who gets 
on to its territory, and every man-of-war which comes into its 
harbours. Each case must be decided according to its merits, and 
there are different rules for the different cases. 
It see1ns evident that the case of the seaplane which the Nether-· 
lands Government is detaining is similar to the case of ship-
wrecked members of belligerent forces rescued by neutral ll1er-
chantmen. 'Vhereas, if such shipwrecked men are rescued by a 
neutral 'varship, they must be interned according to article 13 of" 
Convention No. 10 of The Hague, 1907, they need not be interned 
if rescued by neutral merchantmen and brought to neutral bar--
hours. 
'Vhat are the basic reasons for this difference? That ship--
wrecked men rescued by neutral men-of-war 1nust be interned is-
obvious, because thes·e men have been saved from drowning, and 
perhaps from capture, by getting on neutral territory-a neutral 
man-of-war is neutral territory-and they can as little be allowed 
to go back to their own country as members of belligerent forces-
in land warfare who escaped being captured or killed by crossing-
into neutral territory. On the other hand, if they are rescued by 
neutral merchantmen they do not thereby come into neutral ter-
ritory, for neutral merchantmen are not, as _neutral men-of-war-
are, neutral territory, and any enemy warship n1ay demand that 
the rescued n1en be handed oYer to her. Further, the rescuing-
neutral merchantmen may as well take the rescued tnen into a port 
of their own country as to a neutral port; it is a mere accident 
if the rescued tnen are taken into a neutral port instead of into a 
port of their own country, and for this reason they need not be 
interned if they are brought into a neutral port. 
It may be argued that, in case she does not intern the rescued 
seaplane, Holland would Yiolnte her neutrality and render as-
sistance to Great Britain by allolving the latter to recover a sea-
plane which were othenvise lost. However, the assistance, if 
any, rendered by the release of the seaplane would not be greater· 
than the assistance, if any, to a belligerent comprised in the per-
mission, which according to existing law may be given to escaped 
prisoners of war, and to prisoners brought by troops taking refuge 
on neutral territory, to leaYe such territory with the consequence 
that they will eventually rejoin the armed forces of their country. 
And why should the release of the British seaplane be an unneu-
tral act, whereas the release of ller airman, wlliclt has actuall~­
taken place, is not? If tl1is airman was allo\\-ell to return with. 
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the consequence of eventually joining the British forces again, 
why should not the same be allowed to his seaplane? 
Lastly, it ought to be taken into consideration that none of the· 
enumerated basic reasons for the duty of neutrals to intern bel-
ligerent forces can be made use of in favour of internment of 
the rescued seaplane. The seaplane did not go to Holland for· 
the purpose of escaping capture, or for the purpose of taking in 
supplies, or for the purpose of undergoing repairs. In fact, it-
cUd not get there voluntarily and on its own account, but quite 
accidentally, because the rescuing 1nerchantman might as well 
have taken it to an English as to a Dutch port. 
It must also be remembered that if the seaplane had been 
left at sea it might have been salved by ·His Majesty's Govern-
ment, or by a British ship and taken to a British port. The· 
pilot could speak no Dutch, and the skipper of the fishing boat 
which rescued him could not speak English, so that the pilot was 
unable to give any directions or express any wish with regard 
to the disposal of the se-aplane. (Parliamentary Papers, l\Iisc. 
No.4 (1918) [Cd. 8983], p. 3.) 
Referring to this matter in a communication of July 
11, 1916, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
said: 
Your Excellency points out to me that the case of war mate-
rial salYed on the high seas is analogous to that of the ship-
wrecked belligerent combatant. I feel I must, however, point 
out to your Excellency that the a:qalogy between these two cases· 
is only apparent. International law has defined the treatment of 
combatants rescued on the high seas by a neutral vessel and· 
disembarked in a neutral port. It has sought to safeguard personal 
liberty as far as possible,· and bas established that, only in the-
case of rescue by a neutral warship (which is considered to form 
part of the territory of the country) should the shipwrecked· 
person necessarily be interned. This consideration did not arise 
in the case of material salved on the high seas. In the absence· 
of any ruling in this connection, the neutral Governments are 
then called upon to retain, until the end of the war, n1aterial 
salved by a vessel of their nationality, whether warship o1·· 
merchant-vessel. 
It is true that, by leaving at liberty the belligerent combatant 
brought in by a merchant vessel, the neutral Government enables· 
him to take up arms again, but, just as in the case, quoted by 
rour Excellency, of escaped prisoners of war, regard for personal 
liberty does not permit of his being interned, unless the rules 
of international law expressly impose this restriction. 
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In Yiew of the consitlerations set forth aboYe, I belieYe that 
your I<Jxcellency'H GoYernment ·will surely recogni~e that the 
Queen's GoYernment, while regretting their inability to accede 
to the wishes of the British Government, would be acting in 
contradiction to the principles which haYe till now guided them 
in the obselTation of nPutrality were they to restore Sub-Lieuten-
ant Beare's sear1lane before the end of the war. (Ibid., p. 6.) 
Eritislz-Dutch correspondence, 1917.-Later in Sep-
teinber, 1917, another British seaplane 'vhich can1e do,Yn 
in open sea 'Yas tow·ecl 'vith t'vo occupants to a Dutch 
port. The occupants 'Yere released but the seaplane w·as 
detained. A note 'vas sent by the British ~linister at 
'fhe Hague to the Dutch Foreign Office in 'vhich it w·as 
said: 
A fresh case has now arisen in the case of a British seaplane, 
No. 1,232, manned by Flight-Lieutenant Hopcroft and Petty 
Officer Garner, which can1e clo\Vn on the high seas on the 23rd 
September some 60 miles fron1 the Dutch coast, ·was rescued by 
a Dutch fishing vessel, and towed into the Helder, wllere the 
machine is no\v detained, although the occupants haYe been 
released in accordance with the accepted tenets of international 
Jaw. 
I would beg to remind your Excellency that it was stated in Sir 
A. .Johnstone's note of the lOth Reptember, 1916, that His 
1\lajesty's GoYernment n1aintains that the rule by which ship-
\Vrecked co1nbatants brought into a neutral port by neutral mer-
chant vessels are released ap11lies equally to the case of war 
material belonging to a belligerent which is brought into a neutral 
port by a neutral n1erchant ship. This contention is still main-
tained by His l\Iajesty's GoYernment, and I have therefore to 
request that the Netherlands GoYernment will order the release 
of the airship in (tuestion, n~ well as of tlw t wllich cante clown la~t 
year with Lieutenant Beare on board. 
In the course of a recent conversation, I understood your 
Excellency to be sOinewhat doubtful as to whether the decision 
of the Netherlands Government in the case of such aircraft 
brought in by a neutral vessel was undeniably good in law, but 
I gathered that ;vou are of opinion that such a decision once 
taken cannot be reversetl. I would venture with great respect 
to point out to your Excellency that such an attitude is equiva-
lent to contending that two wrongs can 1nake a right-a conten-
tion which I feel sure your Excellency \Yill realise, on reflection, 
cannot be justifiably maintained as a reason for continuing to 
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i utern aircraft that would appear to be as clearly entitled to· 
release as the officers who manned them. 
Your Excellency, in the -course of the conver~aeon to which 
allusion is n1ade aboYe, stated that ~'OU had reason to think that 
the rule applied in the case of these British airships had also 
been enforced in connection ·with other belligerent machines. It 
would be of great interest to my GoYernment to possess details 
of such instances, and I should therefore be greatly obliged if 
your Excellency would be so good as to furnish me with the sa1ne. 
(Ibid., p. 1~.) 
In again declining to accept the British vie'v, the 
J)utch ~Iinister of Foreign Affairs gave a long argu-
nlent in the course of which he said: 
It goes without saying that if an analogous case concerning 
one of the adYersaries of Great Britain were to arise, for ex~nn­
llle, if a German dirigible were brought into Holland in similar 
circumstances, the Queen's Government ·would in the same way 
not think of restoring it before the end of the war. I venture 
to make this apparently superfluous remark in order to show 
tlwt, if the Queen's Government were to accer>t the British 
GoYernment's point of view, they would be obliged in such cir-
cumstances to restore those engines of wnr to the Government 
to which they belong innnediately on their arrival on Netherlands 
territon·. As to ships of war, in view of the special stipula-
tions of international law with regard to them, they can only 
be ~ubjected to this same treatment in the case of their being 
found at sea deserted by their crews; if, on the contrary, the 
crew is still on board, while the ship has sustained dan1age 
and is tl'ying to tnake a neutral port to effect repairs, the Queen's 
Govenunent will have to decide whether the principle expressed 
in article 17 of the 13th Convention requires the release of the 
ship and her crew. (Ibid., p. 16.) 
The British Govern1nent again rene\-ved its contention 
in a note of Decen1ber 21, 1917. 
9. The Netherlands Government base their refusal to restore 
to His :\Iajesty's Government the articles detained on the gen 
eral ground that there is no rwecise rule covering the question 
of their proper treatment, and that their restoration would 
be an act reinforcing the armed strength of a belligerent, and 
therefore contrary to neutrality. The argument is supported, 
in the eyes of the Netherlands Government, by article 6 of the· 
13th Hague Convention, which forbids the direct or indirect 
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supply of war material by a neutral Government to a belligerent. 
It is contended that the liberation of the crews of the seaplanes 
referred to above was prescribed by a definite rule of interna-
tional law overriding the general prohibition against strengthen-
ing a belligerent's military strength; this rule cannot, accord-
ing to the Netherlands Government, be applied by analogy to 
the articles rescued at the same time or in similar circunl-
stances, because the general prohibition which they conceive to 
necessitate the action which they have taken 1nust hold good 
unless explicitly overridden. 
10. In all the cases enumerated above, with the exception of 
the seaplane rescued by the Norwegian steamship Orn, Dutch 
subjects have-so far as is known, unasked-taken possession of 
the property of His Majesty's Government on the high seas and 
.carried it into Netherlands jurisdiction. On requesting the resto-
ration of the property thus gratuitously taken from them, His 
Majesty's Government are met '\Vith the excuse that to release 
the articles would be to add to the armed strength of Great Brit-
ain, and would therefore be contrary to the neutrality of the 
Netherlands. The practical effect of such a ruling is that Dutch 
seamen who, from motives of hu1nanity, rescue wrecked British 
.airmen and their machines, becon1e-no doubt entirely contrary 
to their wishes or their expectations-instrumental in dilninishing 
the armed strength of Great Britain. In the worst case noted 
(that in which a machine-gun and other gear was re1noved from a 
seaplane by the crew of the Noord-Hinder lightship, who 'vere 
Netherlands Government servants), it is difficult to perceive much 
difference between such conduct and the misappropriation of goods 
'vhich becomes the subject of criminal proceedings. Yet the resto-
ration of the articles thus taken is refused on the ground of neu-
trality. 
11. The Netherlands Government contend that, if it 'vere not for 
the existence of an express provision of international law over-
Tiding the general rule, they would be obliged by the prohibiiit)n 
.against adding to the armed strength of a belligerent to intern 
the cre"\vs of belligerent warships or aircraft rescued and brought 
to the Netherlands by neutral merchant ships. It must be re-
lnarked that, if this general prohibition really had the effect pre-
tended, it could scarcely be overridden without a definite regula-
tion laying down in terms that such crews were not to be in-
terned. No such positive regulation exists. The rule under which 
persons in the above position are released is tnerely mentioned, as 
it were in passing, in the report of the Drafting Committee on 
':rhe Hague Convention for the adaptation- of the principles of the 
Geneva ConYention to lVIaritime ",.arfare. It is evidrnt that it is 
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uot a rule overriding a wider princir1le, but is one recognised us 
flowing naturally from the general principles which govern the 
question of the internment of belligerent persons and war material 
by neutral Powers. Those general principles apply equally to 
persons and to material by analogous circumstances, and this fact 
is not altered by the chance that the case of combatants rescued 
by neutral merchant ships is n1entionecl in the report on the lOth 
Hague Convention, while no allusion to the case of material in 
a similar position occurs in an equally authoritative document. 
12. As regards the reference made by the Netherlands Govern-
tnent to the terms of article 6 of the 13th Hague Convention, His 
l\lajesty's Government can only express astonishment at being 
asked to consider such an argu1nent. The article refers to the 
supply by a neutral to a belligerent Power of war material owned 
by the neutral, and has no wider scope. Furthermore, it must be 
<>bserved that the seaplanes and other articles now in question 
would never have cmne into the possession of the Netherlands 
Government at all if they had been left alone by the Dutch sub-
jects who brought them into the Netherlands ports. There could 
haYe been no question of the Government furnishing any of the 
articles to His :Majesty's Government had they simply refrained 
from ilnpounding goods which no rule of international law re-
quired the1n to seize. 
13. I request that you will address a note in the above sense 
to the Netherlands :Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that 
His :l\Iajesty's Government is unable to perceive any force in the 
arguments by which he seeks to defend the action of his Govern-
ment, and at the same time reiterate the request for the release 
and return of the articles in question. (Ibid., p. 17.) 
Son1e of this correspondence sho,vs the effect of the 
strain of war in an attempt .to obtain from a neutral all 
possible concessions in the 'vay of favorable treatment on 
the one hand and of an attempt to avoid all possible coin-
plications to 'vhich a neutral n1ight be exposed on the 
other. Possibly the hope of salvage money 1nay also 
sti1nulate a private neutral vessel to bring in a disabled 
aircraft found on the sea. 
Transformation. of civil aircraft.-In 1919 the Su-
pren1e Council of the Peace Conference proposed to the 
Aeronautical Con1mission a1nong others the follo,ving 
question : " Can civil aeroplanes and airships be easily 
transfor1ned into 'veapons of 'Yar? " The aeronautical 
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commtssion 1nade up of technical representatives from 
the United States~ the J3ritish En1pire, I~"'rance, Italy, 
Japan, Belgitun, Brazil~ Cuba, Greece, Portugal, Ru-
Inania and Serb-Croa t-SloYene States, after considera-
tion, replied unanin1onsly ~ ·· Yes, con11nercial aeroplanes 
and airships can be Yery easily and quickly transfonned 
into 'veapons of 'var." 
CeneT·al princ-iples~ J,919.-'fhe c1egrees to \vhich the 
principles of regulation of aYiation had advanced is eYi-
dent in the discussions prelin1inary to the negotiation of 
the treaty of peace and the conYention relating to inter-
national air navigation in 1919. On April 7, 1919, the 
following 'vas approYecl by the 1\_eronautical Con11nis-
SlOll: 
LIST OF PHINCIPLES SET'TLED BY THE CO)[.MISSION :FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF GUIDING THE SUBC<HDIITTEES IN THEIR ".,. ORK 
1. RecogniUon-
( 1) Of the principle of tl1e full antl absolute soYereignty of 
each State oYer the air a uoYe its territories and territorial \Ya ters, 
carrying with it the t•ight of exclusion of foreign aircraft: 
(2) Of the right of eneh State to impose its jurisdiction oYer 
the air aboYe its territory and terr~torial waters. 
2. Subject to the principle of so,,·ereignty, recognition of the de-
sirability of the greate~t freedom of international air naYigation 
in so far as this freetlon1 is consistent with the security of the 
State, with the enforcen1ent of reasonable regulations relatiYe to 
the admission of aircraft of the contracting States and with the 
domestic legislation of the State. 
3. 'Vith regard to domestic regulations relatiYe to the admis-
sion and treat1nent of the aircraft of the contracting States, 
recognition of the principle of the absence of all discrim:nation 
on the ground of nationalit~·. 
4. 'l~l1e recognition of the principle . that eYery aircraft !nust 
posse8s the nationality of one contracting State only and that 
eYery aircraft 1nust be entered upon the register of the contract-
ing State the nationalit;\' of which it possesses. 
G. Tl1e following proYisions are recognized as desirable fro1n 
an international point of Yie\Y to insure the safe con<luct of 
aerial navigation: 
(i) Regulations for cOinpulsory certificates of airworthiness 
a nd lic('nses for wireless equipment, at least for aircraft used 
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t\)r ~ommercial punlOses. :\Iutual recognition of these certifi-
cates and 1:eenses by the contracting States. 
( ii) Hegulations for compulsory licenses of pilots and other 
per~onnel in charge of aircraft. ~Iutual recognition of these 
licenses by the contracting States. 
(iii) International rules of the air, including international 
rules as to signals, lights, and for the prevention of collisions. 
R(logulations for landing and on the ground. 
G. Hecognition of the principle of special treatment for milital'y, 
nantl, and State aircraft when they are in Government Service. 
7. Hecognition of tile right of tran~it without landing for 
interim tional traftic uetween two points outside the territory of 
a contracting State, subject to the right of the State traversed 
to re~ervc to it:·~elf its own iutel'ual con1mercial aerial traffic 
and to eompel landing of auy aircraft flying over it by 1ueans 
of av1n·opriate signal:.;. 
8. Hecognition of the right of use. by the aircraft of all the 
contrading States, of all vuhlic nero<lromes upon the principle 
that ~harges for landing facilities should be imposed without 
discrimination on the ground of na tionalits. 
9. Recognition of tile vrincip1e of ·mutual indemnity between 
the contracting States to coYer d;nwtge llone to 11erson or prop-
erty iu one State hy Go,·ernment aircraft of another State. 
10. Hecognition of the necessity of a per1nanent International 
.Aei"OlW uj:ical Commission. 
11. Hecognitiou of the obligation of each contracting State 
to giYe e1te(·t to the provisions of the eonYention by its domes-
tic legislation. 
12. Recognition of the r>rinciple that the convention does not 
affe~t the rights aiHl dutie~ of belligerents or neutrals in time 
of war. (Commission de l'Aeronnutique. p. 18.) 
Questions in II ouse of (/onnnons.-Soine of the rescues 
of the cre,Ys of sub1narines ga Ye rise to questions in re-
gard to their treatn1ent by neutrals. In the House of 
Con11nons, January 13, 191G: 
1\Ir. Swift 1\lacNeill asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs whether the crew of the British submarine which sank 
off Texel on the 6th instant, having :-:prung a leak and grounded, 
who were rescued by a Dutch cruiser and ·brought into Helder, 
have been interned at Groningen by the Dutch Government; 
whether, ha,·ing regard to the fact that the British submarine 
whose -crew were thus rescued was not sunk by a belligerent, the 
detention or internment of that ere"· by the Dutch Govennnent 
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is contrary to the principles and practice of international law; 
whether Article 13 of Convention X, of the Second Peace Con-
ference, providing that if shipwrecked sailors are tnken on 
board a neutral man-of-war precaution must be taken so far as 
possible that they do not again take part in the operations of 
the war, applies only to sailors whose ·ships have been 'vrecked 
by the enen1y, not to sailors whose ships have been 'vrecked 
in the ordinary course of navigation; and whether Great Britain 
will demand the immediate release from detention of these 
sailors, whose case does not differ from that of any other British 
subjects in neutral territory, and who should, even if their ship 
had been disabled by a belligerent, as in the case of the Russian 
sailors rescued by British, French, and Italian cruisers from 
ships disabled by the Japanese, be not detained but handed over 
to Great Britain on the condition that they should not take part 
in hostilities during the 'Var? 
Sir E. GREY. The crew of the E 17 has been interned by the 
Dutch Government, but the place of internment is as yet un-
known to His Majesty's Government. 
The answer to the second part of the question is that Article 
13 of Convention X of The Hague draws no distinction between 
ships wrecke<l by the enen1y or in the ordinary course of na vi-
ga tion. As to the remainder of the bon. 1\iember's question, I 
\Viii see that the suggestions and arguments put forward by him 
are very carefully considered. (Parliamentary Debates, Com-
nlons, 1915-1916, Vol. LXXVII, p. 17 43.) 
, Repairing in neutral port.-Authorities are bound in 
general by the obligation to use due diligence that the 
port shall not become a base, and by previous principles 
and practice of Great Britain. T'his obligation to use 
due diligence is en1bodied in the provisions of the treaty 
of \Vashington, 1871, 'vhich states, in Article VI: 
A neutral Government is bound-
First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, 
or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has 
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on 
war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use 
like diligence to prev~nt the departure from its jurisdiction of 
any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such 
\·essel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within 
such jurisdiction, to warlike use. 
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Secondly, not to permit· or suffer either belligerent to 1nake 
use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against 
the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of 
military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. 
'l'hirdly, to exercise clue diligence in its own ports and waters, 
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any 
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties. 
After 1871 these principles 'vere generally a pprovecl. 
In 1907 at The Hague Conference, Great Britain pro-
posed as a basis for a rule: 
A neutral State must not knowingly permit a warship of a 
belligerent to repair within its jurisdiction the injuries resulting 
from a combat with the enemy, nor in any case to make repairs 
in excess of what will be necessary for navigating. 
Japan 1nade a similar proposal. 
After much discussion a provision in regard to re-
pairs was embodied as article 17 of the Thirteenth Con-
vention on Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime 'V ar, 
as follows: 
In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may only 
carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them 
seaworthy, and may not add in any n1anner whatsoever to their 
fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power shall 
decide ·what repairs are necessary, and these must be carried out 
with the least possible delay. 
1"'he British, 'vhile objecting to so1ne articles of this 
conYention, regarded this article 17 as a fair statement 
0f the existing law. 
The ~·Glasgow,~' 1911,.-In the Battle of Coronel be-
t,yeen the British and Gern1an fleets off the 'vest coast 
of Chile on N oYeinber 1, 1914, tw·o British vessels ".,.ere 
sunk and others "-ere da1naged. T'he cruiser Glasgo -w 
\Yas reported to have received five holes fro1n Gennan 
shell fire. The Glasgow ste~uned under orders a ,vay 
fro1n the a.rea of battle, passed through the Straits of 
)!agellan~ and on X oYeinber 20, 'vas reported as repair-
ing at Rio de ,Janeiro. 
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THE "GLASGOW" AT HIO 
RI<:PORTED SHARE IN ACTION OFF CHILE 
(From our correspondent) 
NEw YonK, Xor. 20. 
The Brazilian Goverrnnent has given IJermission for the British 
cruiser Glasgow to enter the dry dock at Hio de .Janeiro to n1ake 
urgent repairs. The Glctsgow, according to dispatches published 
in the American Press, has five holes in her hull from shell fire. 
Four of her crew were wounded in the battle off Chile. 
Officers of the Glasgow are quoted as saying that at the outset 
of the battle Admiral Cradock from the flagship Goocl Hope, 
ordered the Glasgow and Otranto, in view of the higher power 
of the Gennan squadron's guns, to seek a place of refuge. Not-
withstanding this order the Glasgow answered the German fire. 
In the first few minutes of the fight, the officers of the Glasgow 
are stated to have said the Good Hope had one of her two 9-2. in. 
guns dismantled and her n1agazine ·exploded. Admiral Cradock 
and the crews of the Good H 01Je and ][ omnouth, it is believed, 
went down with their ships. The battleship Canopus, according 
to the story attributed to the officers of the Glctsgow, steaming 
only 16 knots, could not arrive in time to participate in the 
fight. . 
The Brazi1inn Govennnent has given the Glctsgow seven days 
in which to tnake the necessary repairs. (London Times, 
Nov. 21, 1914.) 
Later, the Glasgo1v took part in the battle off the 
Falkland Islands, December 8, 1914. 
The " Geier" and the '~ Locksun."-On October 28, 
1914, the British ainbassador raised the question of de-
taining the Geier, a vessel or \Yar of Gerinany, and the 
Locksun, a vessel belonging to the North '3-erinan Lloyd 
Co., vvhich had entered the port of Honolulu. On the 
saine date, the Japanese an1bassador raised the question 
in regard to the intentions of the United States in regard 
to the Geie1". 
On the saine clay, the Secretary of State received froin 
the Treasury Departinent a report from the Collector of 
·(Justoms at Honolulu, as follo,vs: 
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HoNoLULU, Oct. 27, 1914-10.15 p. m. 
On October 15 captain German gunboat Geier requested permis-
sion to make repairs to render vessel seaworthy and estimated 
time for same at one week. On October 20 Naval Constructor 
Furer, at my reque~t, examined the vessel and recommended that 
time be extended eight days from 20th to place boilers in sea worthy 
condition. To-day consul requests from eight to ten days more in 
which to make repairs to steam and feed piping and boilers that 
have been found to be leaking. Consul states captain has used 
every effort to finish repairs, working Sundays and overtime, but 
owing to lack of labor can not finish in less time. Naval Con-
structor Furer has just completed another examination of the 
vessel and reports that he is unable to state how long repairs 
should take, as more leaky tubes may be found as work progresses. 
Honolulu iron works estimates time for repairs at from two to 
three 'veeks, which, in opinion of Furer, is a conservative mini-
mum. Furer reports piping and boilers in bad condition; may 
possibly take further time to repair. Await instructions. 
(American Journal International Law, 1915, Spec. Sup. 9, p. 242.) 
On October 30, 1914, the Counselor o:f the Depart-
ment o:f State sent the :following to the German am-
bassador in regard to the Geier.· 
DEPARTMENT OF . STATE, 
TVashington, October 30, 1914. 
l\ly Dear l\Ir. Ambassador: The Department has been advised 
that the Gennan gunboat Geier put into the port of Honolulu, 
and on October 15 the captain requested pennission to make re-
pairs to render the vessel seaworthy, and estimated the time for 
this work to be one week. The naval constructor of the United 
States at the port of Honolulu examined the vessel on October 
20, and recommended that the time be extended eight days, 
from October 20, in order to place the boilers in a seaworthy 
condition. On October 27, the German consul at that port re-
quested from eight to ten days additional time in which to make 
repairs to steam and feed piping and boilers that have been 
found to be in a leaking condition. Upon a further examina-
tion, the United States naval constructor reports that he is un-
able to state how long repairs should take, as conditions re-
quiring remedy may be found as 'vork progresses. It is also 
reported that, on accoun~ of the generally bad condition of the 
piping and boilers, further time may be required to complete all 
repairs. 
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The circumstances in this case point to the gunboat Ge·ier as 
a ship that at the outbreak of war finds iself in a more or less 
broken-down condition and on the point of undergoing general 
repairs, but still able to keep the sea. In this situation the 
Government belie·ves that it does not comport with a strict 
neutrality or a fair interpretation of the Hague Conventions, to 
allow such a vessel to complete unlimited repairs in a United 
States port. The Government therefore has instructed the au-
thorities to notify the captain of the Geier that three weeks from 
October 15 will be allowed the Geier for repairs, and that if she 
is not able to leave American waters by November 6, the United 
States will feel obliged to insist that she be interned until the 
expiration of the war. (Atnerican Journal International Law, 
1915, Spec. Sup. 9, p. 243.) 
Later, a communication was sent in regard to the 
Locksun: 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
1-Vashington, November "1, 1914. 
l\ly Dear l\lr. Ambassador: Referring to my previous communi-
cation to you of October 30 regarding the internment of the Ger-
man cruiser Geier, the Department is now in possession of infor-
mation that the German steamship Loeksun, belonging to the 
Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, cleared August 16, 1914, frmn 
Manila with 3,215 tons of coal for lVIenado, in the Celebes; that 
she coaled the German warship Geiler in the course of her voyage 
toward Honolulu, where she arrived soon after the Geier; that 
the Looksun received coal by transfer from another vessel some-
where between Manila and Honolulu, and that the captain stated 
that he had on board 245 or 250 tons of coal when he entered 
Honolulu, whereas investigation showed that he had on board 
approximately 1,600 tons. 
From these facts the Department is of the opinion that the 
operations of the Looksun constitute her a tender to the Geier, 
and that she n1ay be reasonably so cons~dered at the present time. 
This Governtnent is, therefore, under the necessity of according 
the Looksun the same treabnent as the Geier, and has taken steps 
to have the vessel interned at Honolulu if she does not leave im-
mediately. (American Journal of International Law, 1915, Spec. 
Sup. 9, p. 245.) 
To this action the German ambassador took exception, 
and later the Secretary of State replied : 
In the circumstances of this case, as known by the Department, 
it is obliged to state that it still adheres to its previous position 
that the status of the Loeksun as a tender to the ship of war 
INTERNMENT 29 
Geier was sufficiently proved to justify her treatment as such. 
In this connection the Department has the honor to call to your 
attention the following quotation from the award of the Ala-
bama Claims Commission, which seems to establish this prin-
ciple regarding the treatment of tenders, although the applica-
tion of this statement was not made to the exact circumstances 
of the Locksun case: 
"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Tuscaloosa 
(tender to the Alaba;rna), the Clarence, the Taeony, and the 
Archer (tenders to the Flor ida), the tribunal is unanimously of 
opinion that such tenders or auxiliary vessels, being properly 
regarded as accessories, must necessarily follow the lot of their 
principals and be submitted to the same decision which applies 
to them respectively." 
The entire practice of the internment of vessels appears to 
be of recent origin. The doctrine of internment \Vas apparently 
first applied to any gre~t extent during the Russo-Japanese war, 
and it is believed that the treatment of the Locksun is in keep-
ing with the high standard of neutrality upon which the doctrine 
of internment is based. The Department is not aware that meas-
ures to preserve neutrality are entirely dictated by precedent and 
international law, and it believes that belligerents hardly have 
proper cause to question an attitude on neutrality justly in 
advan~e of precedent and international law if it is applied by 
the neutral impartially to all belligerents. As to the advisibility 
of assuming such an attitude, the Department is impressed with 
the proposition that the neutral and not the belligerent is the 
proper judge in the circumstances. (American Journal Interna-
tional Law, 1915, Spec. Sup. 9, p. 251.) 
Spaight's opinion.-J. M. Spaight, "\vho has written 
much upon various phases of air law, says particularly 
of the situation at the end of the World War regarding 
belligerent aircraft salvaged by neutral private vessels: 
The law upon the point-indeed, upon the whole question of 
belligerent air entry-was unsettled, but a rule was being created 
by practice, and to allow exceptions from it was unwise. Save 
when allocated to, and in contact with, a warship, which, itself 
for some purposes the "territory" of its State, may be regarded 
as imparting its own character to an aircraft carried upon it 
or lashed to it, belligerent military aircraft brought into neutral 
jurisdiction under whatever circumstances should, it is sub-
mitted, be subject to the one universal and inelastic rule that 
they must be detained by the neutral authorities. Relax that 
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rule and the door opens to a host of possible exceptions and 
complications. (Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, p. 438.) 
\ I nternment.-ln general, aircraft and their personnel 
entering neutral jurisdiction during the vVorld 'Var 
were interned. This was the case whether the aircraft 
entered in distress or flew within neutral jurisdiction. 
Sometimes aircraft flying 'vithin neutral jurisdiction 
'vere brought down by gunfire as was the case in Switzer-
land and the Netherlands. It made no difference even 
i£ an aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction in error sup-
posing it was still in belligerent territory. Sometimes 
notification was given by signal, rocket, or in some other 
manner, but absence o£ notification was not a ground £or 
exemption £rom liability. 
There is no reason vvhy belligerent aircraft should, 
within neutral jurisdiction, receive any more favorable 
treatment than that extended to naval craft, and as the 
risks following entrance are greater, the accepted doc-
trine is that belligerent military aircraft may not enter 
neutral jurisdiction and the rules proposed by the com-
mission o£ jurists at The Hague in 1923 imposed duties 
upon the neutral. 
Article 42. A neutral Government must use the means at its 
disposal to prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent 
military aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have 
entered such jurisdiction. 
A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to 
intern any belligerent military aircraft which is with1u its juris-
diction after having alighted, for any reason whatsoever, together 
\vith its crew and the passengers, if an~ ... ~}924, Naval 'Var Col-
lege, International Law Documents, p. 1~ 
The commission o£ jurists in 1923 referred to article 
15 o£ the 1907 Hague Convention £or the Adaptation to 
Naval War o£ the Principles o£ the Geneva Convention 
which provided that-
The shipwrecked, sick, or wounded, who are landed at a neutral 
port with the consent of the local authorities, must, unless an 
a rrange1nent is made to the contrary between the neutral State 
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and the belligerent States, be guarded by the neutral State so as 
to prevent them again taking part in the operations of the War. 
The expenses of tending them in hospital and interning them 
shall be borne by the State to which the shipwrecked, sick, or 
'vounded persons belong. (1908, Naval \Var College, Inter-
national Law Situations, p. 207.) 
The proposed rules in 1923 extended this principle 
of internment to persons brought in upon a neutral mili-
tary aircraft in article 43 as :follows : 
The personnel of a disabled belligerent military aircraft res-
cued outside neutral waters brought into the jurisdiction of a 
neutral State by a neutral military aircraft and there landed 
shall be interned. (1924, Naval \Var College, International Law 
Documents, p. 134.) 
Practice in the World War was to release airmen 
rescued by nonmilitary craft whether air or marine 
when the airmen 'vere brought within neutral jurisdic-
tion. "\Vhether belligerent airmen rescued by public 
neutral nonmilitary craft should be released is still 
somewhat uncertain but as the public neutral craft, 
e. g. a royal neutral yacht, would be exempt :from visit 
and search, it would seem that rescued airmen should be 
liable to the sa1ne treatment when entering the neutral 
port as 'vhen rescued by a neutral vessel of war. The 
rescue of air1nen and aircraft by neutral private vessels 
during the World War seems to have been :followed by 
release of airmen and internment of the aircraft. 
Seaplane rescue and repairs.-It is generally admitted 
that a neutral should conduct itself in a humane manner 
toward belligerents and that such conduct toward one 
belligerent can not be regarded by the other as un-
:friendly. The seaplane when upon the surface of the 
water is according to the decisions of courts to be treated 
as a seacraft would be treated and incurs the same lia-
bilities. The shipwrecked personnel of a belligerent ves-
sel of war rescued by a neutral are to be treated ac-
cording to the provisions of article 15 of the Conven-
tion :for the Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles 
of the Geneva Convention. 
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While a naval vessel which is within a harbor in 'vhich 
24-hour sojourn is permitted, may 'vithin the period 
make repairs necessary to render the vessel seaworthy if 
it enters under its own power, if the neutral brought the 
disabled vessel in from the high sea, the vessel should be 
interned. This principle should be applied even more 
strictly to a seaplane. The Commission of Jurists in 
1923 in its report proposing article 42 said : 
The obligation on the part of the neutral Power to intern coYers 
not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents. The ob-
ligation is not affected by the circumstances which led to the 
military aircraft coming within the jurisdiction. It applies 
whether the belligerent aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction, 
voluntary or involuntarily, an'd whatever the cause. It is an 
obligation owed to the opposing belligerent and is based upon 
the fact that the aircraft has come into an area where it is not 
subject to attack by its opponent. 
The only exceptions to the obligation to intern an aircraft are 
those arising under articles 17 and 41. The first relates to flying 
ambulances. Under the second, an aircraft on board a war-
ship is deemed to be part of her, and therefore will follow the 
fate of that warship if she enters neutral ports or waters. If 
she enters under circumstances which render her immune from 
internment, such aircraft will likewise escape internment. 
The obligation to intern belligerent military aircraft enter-
ing neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern the 
personnel. These will in general be combatant members of the 
belligerent fighting forces, but experience has already shown 
that in tilne of war military aeroplanes are employed for trans-
porting passengers. As it may safely be assumed that in time 
of war a passenger would not be carried on a belligerent mili-
tary aircraft unless his journey was a matter of importance 
to the Government, it seems reasonable also to comprise such 
passengers in the category .of persons to be interned. (1924, 
Naval War College, International Law Docurnents, p. 133.) 
SOLUTION 
(a) The govern1nent of State Z should deny the re-
quest of the commander of the dirigible of the air 
forces of State X to replace the hydrogen by helium. 
(b) The government of State Z should intern the 
sea plane and its personnel. 
